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ABSTRACT 
 
‘We Are All Poor Here’: Economic Difference, Social Divisiveness, and Targeting Cash 
Transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Frank Ellis 
(School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia, UK) 
 
Social transfer practitioners are familiar with the social divisiveness that transfers can 
inadvertently create. One manifestation of this potential divisiveness is the oft expressed 
opinion voiced in community meetings, or by key informants, that ‘we are all poor here’. 
This is more often than not articulated by respondents as a plain statement of fact, not as 
special pleading nor with undertones of victimisation. This paper examines the circumstances 
of small economic difference giving rise to the sentiment captured by ‘we are all poor here’, 
utilising income distribution data from three SSA countries to illustrate important cautionary 
features that arise for the workable scaling up of cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
paper focuses on differences in per capita consumption in the long tail representing up to 60 
per cent of the population that typifies national income distributions in the poorest countries. 
 
The paper first reprises the efforts made by practitioners to narrow down eligibility to cash 
transfers to the destitute or ultra-poor, often defined as those unable to attain even the 
minimum acceptable level of calorie intake from their own efforts. Both proxy indicators and 
the deployment of a 10 per cent cut off point to determine the scale of cash transfers are 
discussed. The paper examines inter-decile per capita consumption differences for Malawi, 
Zambia and Ethiopia as revealed by national budget surveys. These show that as a rule of 
thumb US$2 per capita per month separates the poorest decile from the next poorest decile in 
the income distribution, and US$9-10 per capita per month separates the poorest decile from 
the sixth decile. 
 
It is deduced, first, that the sentiment ‘we are all poor here’ accurately reflects the very small 
differences in personal and family circumstances separating everyone falling within the 
bottom 50-60 per cent of per capita consumption in poor mainly rural SSA countries; second, 
that beneficiary selection in cash transfer schemes therefore occurs within a context of very 
close proximity in well-being, life styles, command over assets and income streams, and real 
material consumption of this proportion of the population; and, third, that these wafer thin 
differences in consumption capabilities are narrower still in rural areas than in country 
averages, since urban income distributions are always significantly less equal than rural ones. 
 
Existing pilot cash transfers are examined in the light of these findings, and it is found that 
they are unable to achieve their destitution reduction goals without inevitably creating some 
proportion of ‘leapfrogging’ by recipients above the levels of per capita consumption of non-
recipients in adjacent income deciles. Social divisiveness is explained by small economic 
difference. The findings place some doubt on the merits of the 10 per cent rule that has been 
used to establish cut-off points in pilot cash transfers in Zambia and Malawi (and most 
recently Kenya). Without intending to be definitive on such matters, it is pointed out that 
categorical targeting such as social pensions avoids social invidiousness because all citizens 
understand that if and when they reach the eligible age threshold, they, too, will be entitled to 
the benefit. 
 
Keywords: destitution, cash transfers, targeting, income distribution, Africa 
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‘We Are All Poor Here’: Economic Difference, Social Divisiveness, and Targeting Cash 
Transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa1 
 
Frank Ellis 
 
‘We Are All Poor Here’ 
Social transfer practitioners are familiar with the social divisiveness that transfers can 
inadvertently create, but there is little proper research in this area, rather anecdotal evidence 
that crops up in a scattered way in mission reports and scheme evaluations. One 
manifestation of this potential divisiveness is the oft expressed opinion voiced in community 
meetings, or by key informants, that ‘we are all poor here’. This is more often than not 
articulated by respondents as a plain statement of fact, not as special pleading nor with 
undertones of victimisation. Despite the strenuous efforts by deliverers of social protection to 
explain transparently why certain individuals or families are deemed eligible to receive 
transfers while others are not, and this includes the involvement of communities themselves 
in beneficiary selection, a sense of puzzlement and unfairness about the selection process can 
nevertheless persist in communities long after targeting decisions have been made. 
 
There are other ways, too, that this sense of unfair exclusion affects behaviours around social 
transfers. These include the restructuring of household demography in order to meet scheme 
criteria for inclusion (e.g. acquiring more orphans, small children, school age children, 
elderly household members); collusion between community welfare committee members and 
beneficiaries on sharing benefits; so-called ‘elite capture’ in which community leaders or 
local public officials ensure their friends and relatives are on beneficiary lists; and a sense by 
public officials that they deserve remuneration for helping manage transfers since this is an 
extra work obligation not envisaged by their very low salaries. In rare instances, pooling and 
equal sharing of a social transfer may occur, reflecting a community consensus that equity of 
outcomes is preferable to the targeting criteria imposed from outside.2 However, the more 
common response is for a lot of individual manoeuvring to occur around gaining access to all 
or part of the transfer on offer. 
 
This paper examines the circumstances of small economic difference giving rise to the 
sentiment captured by ‘we are all poor here’, utilising income distribution data from three 
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries to illustrate important cautionary features that arise for 
the workable scaling up of cash transfers in SSA. The paper focuses on differences in per 
capita consumption in the long tail representing up to 60 per cent of the population that 
typifies national income distributions in the poorest countries. In order to set things in motion, 
the paper first reprises the efforts made by practitioners to narrow down eligibility to cash 
transfers to the destitute or ultra-poor, often defined as those unable to attain even the 
                                                 
1
  I am very grateful to Bob Baulch, Gabriel Demombynes and John Hoddinott for supplying me with 
the mean decile consumption per capita from recent household budget surveys in Malawi, Zambia 
and Ethiopia respectively, on which the economic difference discussion of this paper is based. My 
colleague Ed Anderson also helped with data extraction. The paper draws on insights gained while 
the author worked on the evidence component of the Regional Hunger and Vulnerability 
Programme (RHVP) in southern Africa, one outcome of which is a forthcoming book (Ellis, 
Devereux & White, 2009). The paper has benefited from comments by Stephen Devereux, 
Nicholas Freeland and  Phil White. 
 
2
  This is said to have occurred in some communities during the implementation of the Targeted Input 
Programme in Malawi 2002-03 
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minimum acceptable level of calorie intake from their own efforts. The paper is concerned 
solely with routine and predictable cash transfers, not with emergency transfers, nor with ad 
hoc responses to temporary seasonal or spatial food entitlement deficits. 
 
Criteria for Identifying the Destitute or Ultra Poor 
It is well understood that resources for social transfers are limited. Especially in the context 
of trying to convince governments that there is political mileage for them in instigating 
publicly-funded transfers, their aggregate size needs to be kept to some quite small proportion 
of government budgets in order to be remotely acceptable. However, even without political 
sensitivities around scaled-up social protection, it has always been the case that those seeking 
to ameliorate the adverse circumstances of the worst off in African societies have had to 
devise complicated methods for delineating their target group of beneficiaries, and 
differentiating this group from other, almost as deserving, poor and vulnerable people. 
 
In the absence of realistically being able to generate data on the true material circumstances 
of very poor and vulnerable families in African communities (i.e. to do means testing), 
practitioners have for many years tended to utilise ‘proxy indicators’ for identifying the ultra-
poor. Proxies can be to do with the headship of the household (women, elderly, child, 
disabled headed households), evidence of lack of able-bodied adult labour in the household 
(elderly looking after orphans, carers looking after chronically sick adults etc.), lack of land 
for cultivation (unless the transfer requires access to land in order to fulfil its remit, such as 
free farm input packages), or plainly inadequate diet (observed to be consuming only one 
meal per day). Proxy indicators are often multiple (several criteria must be met 
simultaneously in order to secure eligibility), and they may be cascading (two or three basic 
criteria must first be met, then supplementary criteria are brought into play in order to refine 
the beneficiary list). 
 
More recently it has been proposed by interpreting national level demographic and household 
budget survey data that the poorest and most labour-constrained 10 per cent of households 
reliably correspond to the ‘non-viable’ destitute requiring regular social transfers (Schubert & 
Goldberg, 2004; Schubert & Huijbregts, 2006). Leaving aside the dubious notion of a ‘non-
viable’ person or household (disability advocates might have something to say about that), 
this 10 per cent proposition has achieved a certain authenticity, being used as the basic rule-
of-thumb for beneficiary selection in pilot social cash transfer schemes in Zambia and 
Malawi, and forming an important focal point for discussion about beneficiary selection in 
the recently initiated Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in Kenya. From the viewpoint 
of this paper, the 10 per cent rule provides a useful touchstone because it combines economic 
difference and household demography as key factors determining who should receive social 
transfers and who should be excluded.3 
 
For those unfamiliar with the 10 per cent rule, the basic model deduced by Schubert and 
colleagues is reproduced in Figure 1 below. In this instance the model is calibrated utilizing 
the 2004-05 Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) for Malawi, a nationally representative 
household budget survey covering 5,436 households. Using household expenditure data, the 
IHS2 estimated a national poverty rate for Malawi of 52 per cent, with ultra-poverty 
                                                 
3
  This paper is not written specifically as a critique of the 10 per cent rule, which has made an 
important contribution to evolving practice in the targeting of cash transfers in SSA. Nevertheless 
in its conclusions it does return to the rule and identifies several critical weaknesses for its 
deployment as a targeting principle in scaled up cash transfers. 
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estimated at 22 per cent of the population. Figure 1 divides the implied 1.3 million poor 
households in Malawi in two main ways: first between the poor (A+B = 0.75 million 
households) and the ultra poor (C+D = 0.55 million households); and second between those 
having adequate labour to engage in productive activities to feed their families (A+C = 0.9 
million households) and those lacking such labour (B+D = 0.4 million households). The 
combination of ultra poverty and lack of productive labour (measured by a high ratio of 
dependents in the household) is thus represented by the fourth quadrant in the diagram 
(quadrant D) comprising 0.25 million destitute and deserving households, equal to 10 per 
cent of all households in Malawi. 
 
Figure 1: Identifying Those Most In Need of Social Transfers in Malawi 
 
 Source: Schubert & Huijbregts (2006, p.19) 
 
It is important to note that a 10 per cent rule does not avoid the need to utilize proxy 
indicators in eventual beneficiary selection. The 10 per cent rule essentially places a ceiling 
on the number of households assisted, and therefore also puts a cap on the budgetary 
expenditure involved. However, actual beneficiaries up to the permitted 10 per cent are 
selected using proxy indicators, amongst which the absence of able-bodied labour in the 
household is the critical criterion, and other indicators are brought into play as secondary or 
tertiary criteria. This paper returns to the 10 per cent rule in due course after considering 
evidence on economic difference in three SSA countries. 
 
Economic Difference and Cash Transfer Implications 
Data on income distributions in Malawi, Zambia and Ethiopia are set out in Table 1 below. In 
each case, these income distributions are derived from nationally representative large scale 
household budget surveys, for Malawi the 2004-05 IHS2, for Zambia the 2002-03 LSMS, and 
for Ethiopia the 2004-05 HICES.4 In each case the data is presented as mean consumption per 
capita in descending order of deciles, converted from national currencies to US$ at the 
official exchange rates ruling at the time that surveys were conducted.5 Table 2 displays the 
mean differences in per capita consumption per month between deciles, derived from the data 
                                                 
4
  The published analyses of these surveys can be found in Devereux et al. (2006); Government of 
Malawi (2005); Government of Malawi & World Bank (2006); World Bank (2005) and 
Woldehanna et al. (2008). 
 
5
  The exchange rates used to convert local currency data from the surveys into US$ were, for Malawi 
MK108.9 = 1US$; for Zambia ZMK4566 = 1US$; for Ethiopia 8.6 birr = 1US$ 
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in Table 1. Finally, by way of having a ‘neutral’ discussion removed from any single country, 
both Table 1 and Table 2 provide a column giving the simple average of these mean decile 
consumption per capita figures, and the result is graphed in Figure 2.6 This is treated in 
ensuing discussion as a generic income distribution applicable to low per capita income SSA 
countries with large rural populations. 
 
Table 1: Mean Consumption by Decile: Malawi, Zambia, Ethiopia 
(US$ per capita per year) 
 
Deciles Malawi Zambia Ethiopia 
Simple 
Average 
10 760.5 716.0 506.7 661.1 
9 347.6 320.6 270.0 312.7 
8 260.4 243.4 224.3 242.7 
7 211.9 195.3 197.4 201.5 
6 178.4 163.6 176.5 172.8 
5 152.0 138.4 156.5 149.0 
4 129.3 117.5 136.7 127.9 
3 108.9 98.7 120.6 109.4 
2 88.3 78.7 104.6 90.5 
1 62.2 51.3 80.1 64.5 
 
 Source: 2004-05 IHS2 (Malawi), 2002-03 LSMS (Zambia), 2004-05 HICES (Ethiopia) 
 
 
Table 2: Consumption Differences between Deciles: Malawi, Zambia, Ethiopia 
(US$ per capita per month) 
 
Decile 
Interval 
Malawi Zambia Ethiopia Simple Average 
9-10 34.4 32.9 19.7 29.0 
8-9 7.3 6.4 3.8 5.8 
7-8 4.0 4.0 2.2 3.4 
6-7 2.8 2.6 1.7 2.4 
5-6 2.2 2.1 1.7 2.0 
4-5 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.8 
3-4 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.5 
2-3 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.6 
1-2 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.2 
 
Source: derived from Table 1 (inter-decile differences divided by 12 to convert from annual 
to monthly amounts) 
 
                                                 
6
  Lest the reader objects to this as requiring a population weighted average, the purpose here is to 
examine ‘ballpark’ differences between deciles for economies of the type represented by a Malawi, 
Zambia or Ethiopia, and therefore a weighted average that would result in undue weight being 
given to Ethiopia is not required. 
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These various data and graphs demonstrate that cash transfers to the most destitute in low 
income SSA countries must operate within exceedingly narrow parameters of economic 
difference if socially invidious changes in income distribution are to be avoided: 
(1) essentially (as a rule of thumb) US$2 per capita per month separates the poorest 10 per 
cent from the next poorest 10 per cent in the income distribution; 
(2) the gap between the 1st (poorest) and 2nd (next poorest) decile tends to be higher than 
succeeding gaps going upwards through the lower half of the distribution (2nd to 5th 
decile), and this applies in all three countries; 
(3) this may give the impression that the poorest 10 per cent can be satisfactorily identified 
for policy purposes as a separate category for social transfers; 
(4) the inter-decile consumption gap between the 5th and 6th decile remains at roughly the 
same level as between the 1st and 2nd decile; 
(5) progressively steeper rises in mean consumption differences only occur from the 7th 
decile upwards. 
 
 
Figure 2: Generic Income Distribution and Poverty Line Based on Three Countries 
(mean consumption per capita, by decile, US$ per year) 
  
 Source: see sources cited for Table 1 and in footnote 4 above 
 
 
Some important features are deduced or are closely related to these observations. First, the 
sentiment of ‘we are all poor here’ is shown most decidedly not to constitute special pleading, 
but to reflect accurately the very small differences in personal and family circumstances 
separating everyone falling within the bottom 60 per cent of per capita consumption in poor 
mainly rural SSA countries. Second, beneficiary selection in cash transfer schemes in such 
countries occurs within a context of very close proximity in well-being, life styles, command 
over assets and income streams, and real material consumption of 50-60 per cent of the 
population. Third, these wafer thin differences in consumption capabilities are narrower still 
in rural areas than in the national averages shown in Table 2, since urban income distributions 
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are always significantly less equal than rural ones. Indeed if we take Malawi as an example, 
US$9 per month separates the 1st from the 6th decile in rural areas, compared to US$18 per 
month in urban areas, and US$9.7 per month overall.7 
 
The generic data provided in the last column of Tables 1 and 2 and graphed in Figure 2 can 
be utilised to demonstrate the implications of per capita cash transfers of varying amounts, as 
shown in Figure 3. Of course, cash transfers are typically provided to households, and some 
cash transfer schemes adjust for household size while others do not. Ideally a cash transfer 
should adjust for household demography as well as household size; after all a 5-person 
household containing one adult and four small children has different consumption 
requirements from one containing three adults and two teenage children, even if in both 
instances the adults are unable to participate in productive labour for one reason or another. 
However, administrative feasibility places restrictions on how sensitive in practice variations 
in the level of cash transfers to households of different compositions can be. The main point 
made by Figure 3 is that there is exceedingly little room to manoeuvre at the bottom of the 
income distribution if the problem of ‘leapfrogging’ the material consumption of cash 
transfer beneficiaries above adjacent households in the income distribution is to be avoided. 
 
Figure 3: Income Distribution Implications of Varying Levels of Cash Transfers 
(US$ per month) 
 
 Source: As for Figure 2, with illustrative additions. 
 
In Figure 3, a US$2 transfer per month to an individual very nearly brings a mean individual 
in the bottom decile up to the same mean material consumption as the next decile. A transfer 
                                                 
7
  The measure of inequality provided by the Gini coefficient for these three countries is 0.26 
(Ethiopia), 0.34 (Malawi) and 0.35 (Zambia) in rural areas; and 0.44 (Ethiopia), 0.48 (Malawi), and 
0.46 (Zambia) in urban areas. See references provided at footnote 4. 
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of US$10 to a 5-person household would have this effect, but note that the same US$10 given 
to a 4, 3, 2, or 1-person household would bump up such a mean individual increasingly above 
successive adjacent consumption deciles. In fact, if by design or accident an individual were 
to receive US$8 per month, this would leapfrog their material consumption from the first into 
the sixth decile of the income distribution. 
 
In conversations with practitioners, it is apparent that it is thought this problem can be 
avoided if the 10 per cent selected are scattered across the lower income deciles rather than 
being confined to the lowest decile. This is unfortunately not true. Dividing individuals into 
deciles (or for that matter into any other equal shares of the population) is done by strictly 
ordering per capita consumption per person from the highest to the lowest, thus all 
individuals in the lowest decile have lower per capita consumption than all individuals in the 
next decile and so on. It follows that selecting the 10 per cent eligible for cash transfers from 
across several deciles merely means that some rather better off people have been selected in 
preference to the 10 per cent poorest, and therefore the potential for leapfrogging up the 
income distribution is made more likely rather than less likely.8 
 
The question arises as to how well existing cash transfer pilots have performed in terms of 
operating within the narrow parameters that avoid socially invidious alterations in the income 
distribution positioning of beneficiaries. Two schemes (or sets of schemes) are examined 
briefly in this regard: the Zambia pilot cash transfers and the Mchinji cash transfer scheme in 
Malawi. The original Zambia pilot cash transfer is the well known Kalomo scheme funded by 
GTZ and implemented by the Government of Zambia, starting in 2004. This was also the first 
scheme to apply the 10 per cent rule. The Kalomo scheme initially provided 1,027 
beneficiary households with US$6 per month, with no variation for household size. For a 
one-person household at the mean of the bottom decile of the Zambia income distribution at 
that time, this would have catapulted the individual concerned from the first to the fourth 
decile of the income distribution (see Table 1 above). Similar effects in lesser degrees may 
have occurred for two- or more-person households. Average household size in the Kalomo 
scheme was 3.8 persons (Schubert & Goldberg, 2004). 
 
In Zambia, the Kalomo scheme was followed by four other pilot cash transfers, each testing 
different aspects of cash transfer delivery, in Monze, Kazungula, Chipata and Katete districts 
(Ellis, 2007). To take one more example, the Kazungula scheme provided 554 destitute and 
incapacitated households with US$7.5 per month (if they had no children) and US$10 per 
month (if they had children) from 2005 to 2007. In April 2007, these amounts were raised to 
US$10 and US$12.5 respectively. Again, the income distribution effects of such transfers 
depend on household size and composition, and in the case of single person households could 
have bumped their material circumstances up to the levels experienced by individuals in the 
fourth decile.9 
 
In Malawi, a pilot social cash transfer was initiated in Mchinji district in 2006 implemented 
by the government with technical support from UNICEF. This has since been extended to 
three more districts. Monthly cash transfers vary according to household size, and take into 
                                                 
8
  The argument here has been developed from per capita consumption data and magnitudes might 
differ slightly if household level deciles were used instead, depending on the relationship between 
household size and per capita income across the income distribution. 
 
9
  This takes into account the impact of inflation on the real purchasing power of the Kwacha between 
2002-03 and 2005 when the Kazungula scheme started. 
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account if the household has children in primary or secondary school. The income 
distribution effects of the Mchinji scheme are summarised in Table 3. The left side of this 
table provides the level of cash transfer by household size. The right side of the table 
examines how such transfers (on a per capita basis) effect the position of individuals with 
respect to the prior income distribution. 
 
Table 3: Cash Transfers in the Mchinji Scheme and Income Distribution Effects 
(amounts per month) 
 
 A. Cash Transfer Amounts B. Income Distribution Effects 
HH 
Size 
(persons) 
Cash 
Transfer 
(US$) 
Cash 
Transfer 
(MK) 
Transfer 
per 
Person 
 
Decile 
No. 
Mean Cons. 
per cap 
(MK)* 
 Decile 1 
+ Transfer 
per Person 
1 4 600 600  1 
      726        1,326  
2 7 1000 500  2 
   1,020        1,226  
3 10 1400 467  3 
   1,249        1,192  
4 13 1800 450  4 
   1,478        1,176  
    
 5 
   1,724    
*  mean rural decile consumption per capita per month from IHS2 adjusted for inflation of 31.5% 
between 2004-05 & 2006-07 
Source: Schubert & Huijbregts (2006 p.12), own calculations based on IHS2 data 
 
It can be seen in the last column of Table 3 that the amount for a single person household 
risks catapulting the individual from the first to the upper reaches of the third decile 
(MK1,326 compared to MK1,249). However, this effect diminishes as household size 
increases since the scheme transfers less per capita at each successive household size (from 
600 to 500 to 467 to 450 MK per capita). But the effect of school attendance payments 
(MK200 for a primary pupil and MK400 for a secondary pupil) is not factored in here, so that 
a 4-person household with 3 school-age children could achieve a per capita income of 
between MK1,800 and 2,400, giving them the equivalent consumption per capita as the fifth 
or sixth decile.10 
 
The pilot cash transfers in both Zambia and Malawi were designed, of course, in full 
knowledge of the income distribution data that is presented here.11 It was appreciated early on 
that a cash transfer could not bring the per capita income of a household up to the poverty 
line, because in doing so all 10 per cent recipient households would leapfrog their way up to 
the fourth or fifth decile of the income distribution (this follows automatically if the poverty 
rate is around 50 per cent). As stated in Schubert & Goldberg (2004, p.6) ‘The transfer does 
not lift beneficiary households out of poverty. It just lifts them from critical poverty, which is 
life threatening, to moderate poverty’. This seems sensible enough, but the problem is that 
there are another 30-40 per cent of non-recipient households that are also in varying degrees 
                                                 
10
  These observations are made with respect to the mean rural consumption per capita in the bottom 
decile, and would vary in magnitude depending on how far below or above the mean consumption 
was any individual family. 
 
11
  The thinking behind the design of these pilot cash transfer schemes is traced in project documents 
that are accessible on websites: www.socialcashtransfers-zambia.org and www.socialcashtransfers-
malawi.org. 
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below the poverty line, and in very low income rural areas this proportion is even higher (‘we 
are all poor here’), so that invidious comparisons between households are bound to occur 
when some receive a benefit and others do not. 
 
Broader Implications 
This paper has the limited objective of demonstrating the narrow parameters of economic 
difference within which cash transfers must operate if they are to avoid creating ethically 
dubious social tensions between included and excluded groups. It seems almost certain that 
existing social transfer pilots, notwithstanding the sensitivity of their design, have breached 
these parameters at least to some degree. This is because they deliver cash transfers to 
households, and households vary in their demographic size and composition, so that some 
beneficiaries will have ‘leapfrogged’ the standard of living of non-beneficiaries in the same 
communities. 
 
In a prospering society where people’s standards of living are generally on an upward path, 
such difficulties at the margin would be unlikely to matter too much, and indeed could be 
considered a small price to pay in order to secure the adequate nutrition and basic needs of 
those left behind while the majority move forward. Moreover, in such a scenario, those 
moving forward are unlikely to feel resentful of those receiving help, since the level of such 
help will be significantly below their own material situation, or what they are able to aspire to 
in the foreseeable future. 
 
However in Sub-Saharan Africa, and especially in rural areas of the poorest countries, such a 
process is hard to distinguish. Most community members consider (essentially correctly) that 
‘we are all poor here’. Moreover, opportunity is not rising at a rate (nor has it been doing so 
historically) for fractionally better-off individuals to see an improvement in their 
circumstances coming into view round the corner. For this reason, social transfers in SSA 
often involve seeking tiny variations in circumstance that ordinary people do not perceive as 
real differences in order to select a lucky few people as transfer recipients. This inevitably 
creates social tension and division, as well as personal strategies to work around the selection 
criteria that are proposed, or the organisational means of implementing them. 
 
The narrow economic differences that separate the bottom 50-60 per cent of the population in 
many SSA countries place some doubt on the merits of the 10 per cent rule that has been used 
to establish cut-off points in pilot social cash transfers in Zambia and Malawi (and most 
recently Kenya). First, arising from the evidence of this paper, it is exceedingly difficult 
using this rule to avoid propelling the consumption level of some beneficiaries above that of 
non-beneficiaries in the same communities. Second, any such single proportion clearly 
cannot be expected to apply evenly across geographical and social space, even if it can be 
delineated satisfactorily at a national aggregate level. It follows that it will over-capture the 
kind of households it seeks to target in some places (wrong inclusion) while under-capturing 
such households in other places (wrong exclusion).  
 
Third, it is doubtful that the labour capability difference between households that is critical to 
keeping the proportion down to 10 per cent is as clear cut as the rule suggests. The productive 
deployment of labour is not just a matter of labour supply but also of labour demand. 
Households containing labour entirely unemployed, or significantly underemployed, differ 
little in their material conditions from household lacking economically active labour, and 
indeed may even be worse off due to the higher food consumption needs of adult household 
members. Fourth, even if labour is productively deployed, it is possible that its returns are 
- 10 - 
insufficient to meet basic nutritional requirements (the ultra-poverty line), which in all the 
countries mentioned in this paper is double or more than double the 10 per cent proportion of 
poorest households. 
 
Space limitations prohibit a proper exploration here of what these considerations imply for 
scaled up social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. There seems little doubt that categorical 
targeting (child support grants, old age pensions) avoid to a considerable degree the social 
divisiveness (as well as the administrative intricacy) attendant on trying to separate out an 
especially deserving sub-set of the poor from amongst the larger proportion of poor people 
that are little differentiated from each other in terms of the material conditions of their lives. 
Categorical targeting has the considerable added advantage of establishing a right to the 
social transfer for all those who meet the simple criterion that defines the category (such as 
the age threshold in the case of social pensions). Moreover, in the case of social pensions, 
social invidiousness does not occur because all citizens understand that if and when they 
reach the age threshold, they, too, will be entitled to the benefit. 
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